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Responding to a prowler call shortly before midnight on July 29, 1991,
two officers came across two thirteen year-old boys near the alleged crime
scene. 1 The officers escorted the boys to the home of the Franzens, the
parents of one boy, after the boys admitted that they had been on the
premises. Later that same night, the police were informed of a prowler at
the same household. Officer Fragodt, who had been on the earlier call and
now suspected the boys, had the dispatcher phone the Franzen home. The
dispatcher reached only the answering machine. 2
Arriving at the Franzen home, Officers Fragodt and Roberts found a
car parked out front with a warm engine. The front door was unlocked,
with the interior doors open. The officers announced their presence from
outside the house and from inside the kitchen; however, no one responded.
The officers then made their way upstairs, where they came upon Mr. and
Mrs. Franzen. The officers explained the events of the evening and said that
they had come to speak to their son. The officers stated that the door was
open and that they then decided to check and see if everything was all right.
The officers confirmed that the boy was asleep and that his shoes were not
damp. The officers apologized and left the premises.
3
Subsequently, the Franzens filed a complaint in state court alleging
violations of the Fourth Amendment. As a result of an internal police
department investigation, the officers were suspended without pay for the
constitutional violation. This suspension was mandated by police
department rules and regulations providing that violations of the law are
also violations of the departmental rules and regulations. 4 The officers'
union appealed the decision, demanding arbitration as to whether there was
just cause for the suspension.5
The arbitrator did not find any violation of the Franzens' Fourth
Amendment rights; therefore, the arbitrator did not find just cause for the
officers' suspension. 6 The County of Hennepin sought to vacate the
arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
ruling on a constitutional issue. The trial judge denied the County's motion.
In turn, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.7 The
* 527 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1995).
1 See id. at 823.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 824 n.1.
5 See id. at 824.
6 See id.
7 See id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
County appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota on the grounds that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority. Thus, the question before the court was
whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in making a constitutional
determination.
A number of principles concerning arbitration are well settled in
Minnesota jurisprudence and were not disputed by the County. First, the
scope of an arbitrator's authority is determined de novo by the reviewing
court.8 The challenging party bears the burden of persuasion in
demonstrating that the authority was exceeded. 9 In order for the court to
overturn an arbitrator's award, the evidence must establish that the
arbitrator "clearly exceeded the powers granted to [him]." 10 Further, the
arbitration agreement itself is to be interpreted as a matter of contract law.
11
The decision to overturn must not be based upon how the reviewing court
would have ruled on the merits; rather, it should be based solely on the
arbitration agreement. 12 None of these principles were contested; the
position of the County was simply that arbitrators do not have the authority
to make determinations on constitutional matters. The County, and
ultimately the Supreme Court of Minnesota, relied upon the two following
cases: City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters13 and
McGrath v. Minnesota.14
At the time of Richfield, Minnesota had in place a comprehensive
Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PERLA), the primary purpose of
which is the prevention of labor disputes. 15 In relevant part, PERLA
provided the following:
Any provision of any contract required by section 179.70, which
of itself or in its implementation would be in violation or in
conflict with any statute of the state of Minnesota or rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder or provision of a municipal
home rule charter or ordinance or resolution adopted thereto, or
8 See id. (citing Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 495, 290
N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. 1980); State v. Berthiame, 259 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 197)).
9 See id. (citing Hilltop Constr., Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 239
(Minn. 1982)).
10 Id.
11 See id. (citing Ramsey County v. AFSCME, Local 8, 309 N.W.2d 785, 789-790
(Minn. 1981)).
12 See id. (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
13 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979).
14 312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1981).
15 See Richfield, 276 N.W.2d at 48.
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rule of any state board or agency governing licensure or
registration of an employee, provided such rule, regulation, home
rule charter, ordinance, or resolution is not in conflict with
sections 179.61 to 179.66 and shall be returned to the arbitrator for
an amendment to make the provision consistent with the statute,
rule, regulation, charter, ordinance or resolution. 16
The Richfield court construed this subsection to require "parties to
return to the arbitrators when a contract provision would violate or conflict
with any Minnesota statute or rule, municipal home rule charter, ordinance
or resolution, or a rule of any state board or agency governing licensure or
registration of employees."1 7 Noticeably absent from this enumeration is the
Constitution. Accordingly, the court determined that the arbitrator "does
not have authority to make determinations concerning the constitution." 18
This was the Minnesota Supreme Court's first indication that arbitrators do
not have the authority to make constitutional determinations.19
Two years after the Richfield decision was handed down, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota was again faced with the issue of whether constitutional
issues are arbitrable. This time, however, the court was without the aid of a
legislative enactment directing the court as to the scope of the arbitrator's
authority. In McGrath, a number of security guards at a prison called in
sick to protest the suspension of fellow guards resulting from the escape of
an inmate. 20 The Department of Corrections found that the guards abused
their sick privileges and therefore disciplined them. The disciplined guards
filed a complaint alleging deprivation of their civil rights2t and other
16 MINN. STAT. § 179.66(5) (1976) (repealed 1984).
17 Richfield, 276 N.W.2d at 51.
1 8 1d
.
19 See Hennepin, 527 N.W.2d at 824 ("We first indicated an arbitrator 'does not have
the authority to make determinations concerning the constitution' in [Richfield]."); see also
McGrath, 312 N.W.2d at 442 ("We have already indicated that arbitrators are without such
authority in Minnesota.").
Note that the essence of the court's determination that arbitrators are without such
authority was simply a matter of statutory interpretation, namely the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio aiterius (roughly translated, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another"). It has been stated that this doctrine "informs a court to exclude from operation
those items not included in a list of elements that are given effect expressly by the statutory
language." United States v. McQuilken, 78 F.3d 105, 108 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
20 See id. at 439.
21 Allegations of civil rights violations while acting under the color of state law
implicates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which provides in relevant part:
OHIO STATE JOURVAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
violations.22 The trial judge dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the
allegations were all within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement
and that the guards had not exhausted their grievance procedure. The
dispute was arbitrated, resulting in a finding that the prison guards abused
their sick leave provisions. Thus, the discipline of the guards was for just
cause.
23
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the first issue facing the
court was: "Did the trial court err in dismissing appellants' complaint for
failure to exhaust the labor contract grievance procedures?"24 As part of this
inquiry, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it had already indicated
that arbitrators in Minnesota are without the authority to decide
constitutional issues.25 Without discussion of Richfield or other analysis, the
court expressly held that in Minnesota, arbitrators are without the authority
to decide constitutional issues "irrespective of the language of the
arbitration agreement. "
26
Justice Scott concurred with the result but wrote a separate opinion
disagreeing with the majority's holding that an arbitrator may never make a
constitutional determination. 27 In Justice Scott's view, the scope of the
arbitration agreement should control whether the arbitrator may make such a
determination. Justice Scott recognized the impact of the majority's holding
and the advantages of arbitration. "When the state is a party to a labor
contract, grievances are often raised as constitutional issues. To hold that
arbitrators may never consider such issues would circumvent the public
policy which favors arbitration and the speedy resolution of disputes
without initial resort to litigation." 28 As such, Justice Scott would allow
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2 2 McGrat, 312 N.W.2d at 440.
23 See id. at 441.
24id.
25 See id. at 442.
26 id.
27 See id. at 442 (Scott, J., concurring).
2 8 Id. (citing Layne Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 123 N.W.2d 371
(1963)).
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arbitrators "the authority to decide constitutional issues if the parties
indicate such an intent . "..."29
Against this legal background, the Hennepin court was faced with the
issue of whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ruling that there
was no violation of the Franzens' Fourth Amendment rights. The court
noted that "[t]he McGrath decision further states, in unequivocal language,
that.., an arbitrator [may not] decide a constitutional issue." 30 The court
reaffirmed the Richfield and McGrath decisions and again held "that in the
public sector an arbitrator has no authority to make constitutional
determinations, irrespective of the language of the arbitration agreement." 31
Accordingly, the arbitrator was without authority to make the Fourth
Amendment determination.
Having decided that the arbitrator did not have the authority to decide
the constitutional matter, the Fourth Amendment issue was to be decided by
the courts. Since the trial court and court of appeals had examined the
merits of the warrantless entry claim, the question was then properly before
the Supreme Court of Minnesota for review. The court noted that under the
Fourth Amendment of both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions,
warrantless entries are presumptively unreasonable. Considering the
emergency exception as justification for a warrantless entry (the theory
relied upon below) the question became "whether the facts available to the
officer at the moment she entered the home would lead a person of
reasonable caution to believe that someone inside the home needed
emergency assistance." 32 After reviewing the facts of cases upon which
courts have allowed the exception 33 and the facts upon which the deputies
29 id.
3 0 Hennepin, 527 N.W.2d at 825.
31 id.
3 2 Id. at 826 (citing State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992)).
33 See generally State v. Anderson, 388 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that
officers were justified in their warrantless entry under the emergency exception when
responding to a call from the mother of the potential victim that a man was "throwing people
around and had grabbed a little girl" and finding the front room of the house littered with
papers, clothing and toys); State v. Halla-Poe, 468 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. App. 1991) (holding
that warrantless entry of police was justified under the emergency exception when responding
to call of a good Samaritan who had taken a drunken woman home after seeing her swerve on
the highway and was worried about her condition upon leaving her alone). But see United
States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that emergency exception did not
justify the warrantless entry of police when called by a neighbor who was asked to watch a
home while the residents were away, the front door of which he noticed was open).
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based their entry, 34 the court noted that the latter "pale in comparison." 35
Accordingly, the court held that "the circumstances preceding the deputies'
warrantless entry into the Franzen's [sic] home did not objectively
demonstrate a person inside the home was in need of immediate assistance.
Thus, exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless search and the
deputies violated the Fourth Amendment." 36
Curiously, the Hennepin court limited the rule from McGrath that
arbitrators may not make constitutional determinations by adding the
language "in the public sector." 37 Neither the McGrath nor the Richfield
decision contains such language.
In Richfield, the determination that the arbitrator lacked authority was
based on the fact that the statute did not expressly authorize the arbitrator to
make constitutional determinations. In McGrath, the court explicitly held
that arbitrators were without the authority to make constitutional
determinations, providing neither a policy nor statutory basis for doing so.
In turn, Hennepin adopted the McGrath decision through the principle of
stare decisis despite the fact that McGrath (through Richfield) was based on
a statute that was repealed in 1984.38 Absent a statutory basis for
reaffirming the holdings, one would expect that the court would provide
public policy arguments or some other rationale for their decision.
However, the Hennepin decision contains no such support. Absent any real
support, the Hennepin decision is unfounded judicial legislation, or worse
yet, an attempt to thwart the role of arbitrators.
The reasoning in the Hennepin decision appears to conflict with the
final holding. The Hennepin court stated that McGrath clearly stands for the
proposition that arbitrators may not make constitutional determinations. In
contrast, the Hennepin holding stated, "In the public sector, an arbitrator
has no authority to make constitutional determinations ... ." This
34 The deputies based their warrantless entry into the Franzen home on the following
facts: 1) one unresolved prowler call had occurred, 2) a telephone call made shortly
before the deputies arrived was answered by a machine, not a person, 3) the house was
dark, 4) one of the several cars in the driveway was warm, 5) the temperature was
about sixty degrees, the porch was unlocked, and the interior French doors were open,
and 6) no one responded to their shouts and knocks.
Hennepin, 527 N.W.2d at 826. Curiously, the officers relied on the fact that there was a
warm car in the driveway and yet the boys were only thirteen years old and on foot during the
previous encounter. See id.
35 Id.
36 id.
3 7 Id. at 825.
38 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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modification raises the question of whether arbitrators can make
constitutional determinations outside the public sector. As written in
McGrath, the answer is likely "no," whereas under Hennepin, the answer is
at least "maybe."
Aside from the criticism of how the court arrived at its holding, the
limitation of the rule to "the public sector" and the resulting ambiguity
leads to serious concerns about constitutional determinations in the private
sector. If there are public policy reasons for prohibiting arbitrators from
making constitutional determinations, these reasons would likely apply with
equal force in the private sector as well. Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme
Court's limitation was unintentional. This ambiguity could result in lower
courts in Minnesota permitting arbitrators to make constitutional
determinations in private sector arbitrations. Because most constitutional
violations occur in the public sector the limitation may be of little or no
consequence.
However, it is still possible for constitutional issues to arise out of the
private sector. For example, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 39 a racially restrictive
covenant denied the Shelleys proper title to the residence they had
purchased. The covenant, in and of itself, was not forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the agreement was
between private parties. However, when one of the parties sought judicial
enforcement of the covenant, there was sufficient state action. The Supreme
Court held that the covenant was unenforceable, because it violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, a purely
private covenant resulted in a constitutional violation. Hence, if the title
agreement had contained an arbitration clause, then an arbitrator would have
been making a constitutional determination in a private sector arbitration.
The effect of the Hennepin decision has yet to be determined. Courts
must still resolve the question of whether arbitrators in private sector
arbitrations may make constitutional determinations.
Gregory A. Bauer
39 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
248
